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INsun¡.NCE CoNsuMER CouNsnrts Cor,uMN
Avororruc rHE INtnNtroNAL Acrs Excr,usroN IN Cesu¡r,ry INSURÂNcE
By PRIF¡,S soR CREG MrrvRo

On the morning of January L9,1994, Thadius Morehead (Morehead)
was driving his vehicle in Butte, Montana with three friends, Joseph Wandler,
Eric Blom, and Robert Chenoweth. The men were driving around Butte with
the stated purpose of picking fights at random. * x x Soon thereafter, the men
came upon appellant's vehicle on Fl¿rrison Avenue. Appellant s/as accompanied by a friend and the two were on their way to go fishing. Morehead
followed closeiy behind appellant and began flashing his lights and honking
his horn in an effort to get appellant's attention and cause him to pull over
his car. Thinking the driver to be an acquaintance, appellant pulled over into
the Âlbertson's parking lot and stopped. Morehead followed and pulled up
alongside appellant. Joseph ìlandler (Wandler) exited Morehead's vehicle and
approached appellant. When appellant rolled down his window, Wandler
punched appellant in the face. lVhen appellant opened his door, he was
dragged out of his vehicle and beaten, punched, and kicked by Wandler and
one or more of the other men. The men continued to punch and kick
appellant while he was lying on the ground.t

MTLA member Greg

found himself in a

Skakles

common

dilemma factng plarntiffs' lawyers;
his client was injured by the intentional act of tortfeasors who were
likely fudgment proof. The only
hope of obtainng adequate compensation for his client, Wdliam Wendell, was through insurance. In the
words of your old science teacher, it
is intuitively obvious to even the
most casual obsele( that the kind
of people who go around "pickrng
f,rghts at random" are probably the
same people who lack the type of
assets it takes to satisfy the injured
victim's personal iniury judgment.
And, there lies the problem: Public
policy forbids the use of insurance
to indemnify willful wrongdoing by
an insured.2

This policy against insuring the
intentional wrongdoer is expressed
in casualty insurance policies such as
Commercial General Liability policies3 alrd Homeowners policiesa in
which the basic insuring agreements
restrict coverage to arr "occurfence"
which is defined in the policies as ãì
" accident." Automobile policies also
restrict coverage of the insured's lia-
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bility to that arising out of ""an accident."5 Each of these types of policies contain provisions excluding
from coverage "'bodily injury' or
þroperty darnage' expected or intended by the insured" (or "from the
standpoint of the insured"). The
clear intent of the insurance industry
in drafting the policies is to exclude
coverage for anything that might be
deemed an intentional act.

Issues involving restrictron of
coverage to "accidents" or exclusion
of damage "expected or intended by

the insured" generally reach the
courts in the form of coverage disputes between the insured tortfeasor

Strecker's sexual abuse ofhis daughter. New Hampshire insured under a

farm-ranch Comprehensive General

Liability umbrella policy for Strecker
Fatms, Inc., which also named Jake

Strecker individually as insured.
New Hampshire refused coverage
or defense or the ground that
Strecker's sexual abuse ofhis daughter was excluded as "personal injury
...arising out of willful violation of a
penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge or
consent of the insured." Also the
carcier argued that the coverage was
only for an "occurrence" defined
as "neither expected nor intended
from the standpoinr of the insured." The court upheld the trial
coutt's surrunary judgment ín favor of New Hampshire. Strecker
had testified in deposition that he
sexually molested his daughter for
ten years, had no mental disabilities, and plead guilty to three
felony charges of sexual molestation as a result of his conduct. It is
notable that the court said the coverage depended on the acts

givng rise

to the claims (which acts were intentional) and not on the language of

the complant which thè attorney
ca-n generally dnft to plead a claum

and the insurer or between the tortfeasor's assignee when the tortfeasor
has conveyed his coverage claim and
any attendant bad faith claim to the

within the coverage.

plaintiff in settlement.

to felony aggøvzted criminal assault

Montana
courts have entertained a range of
such coverage issues over the years.

Acts evincing clear intent to
iniure
For example,'n New l:IampshÍre fns. Group v. Stecket6 the
insurer denied coverage for defense
or indemnity in a suit for Jake

In Butns v. Undetwtitets
Adjustíng Co.,' Zelet plead guilty
for striking Burns who then sued
him for negligence. The policy language excluded expected or intended conduct except that resultrng
from reasonable use of force to
protect people or property. Underwriters and Consolidated Insurance
refused defense or indemnity after
takrng a statement from T.ei\er that

PacB 15

the landowner filed a counterclaim
inten- agarnst Lindsay Drilling allegurg, on
tional. In Bloxham v. Mountain the one hand, that Lindsay
dered against Zeùer who then asin
settlement West Farm Buteau Mut. fns. "fraudulently and deliberately"
signed to the plaintiff
Co.,o the insurer denied coverage salted drilling core samples with
his rights against the insurers. The
small quantìties of gold and, on the
when its inebriated insured lost a
Montana Supreme Court upheld the
other, that the company negligently
golf bet and caused $31,000 d^ug.
lower court's decision that there was
allowed bystanders to tamper with
by driving his pickup truck on the
no duty to defend even though the
complaint alleged a claim cleady tennis courts at Meadowlark Coun- the core samples. The court found
the negligence allegation did not inwithin the coverage. The court said, try Club in Great Falls. In the provolve "intended or
"the proper foexPected conseù
cus of inquiry is
rndicated his act was intentionat. A
default negìigence verdict was ren-

the acts Sving
rise to coverage,

not the language
of the com-

plaint." Justice

Sheehy

not always be dispositìve on
issue of whether the act was

...the test of whether the insurer must defend is
whether the complaint states a claim within coverage,
not whether the insurer has evidence outside the
complaint that causes it to think it can win.

dis-

sented stating

quences" so that

the claim did in
fact set forth a

covered

t'occuffence" afld
vacated the ttial
court's declaratory

that the test of whether the insurer
must defend is whether the complaìnt states z clzirn within coverage,

ceeding for crimina-l mischief, the
insured admitted that the prosecution had probable cause to charge

iudgment thathad been granted for

not whether the insurer has evidence
outside the complarnt that causes it
to think it can win.
It is general law that the insurer's duty to defend is detetmined
under the "fout corners" rule requiring defense if the complaint states a
claim that would fall under coverage
if true.t Flowever, ¡he Steckerand
Burns cases would indicate that, in

him \trith the crime. Nevertheless,
the insured steadfastly denied that

Alternative pleading of intent and
negligence
Rule 8(e)(2) Mont. Rules.Civ.P.
allows counsel to plead claims in the
alter¡ztive or hypothetically. The
technique of pleading, in separate
counts, that the tortfeasor's conduct
was intentiond, artd, in the altema-

situations involving egregious or violent felony-type wrongs, the insurer
may indeed avoid defense even if

z claim that is
cognizable under the policy. In
Wendell's case against Morehead,
Wandler, Blom and Chenoweth,
State Farm, which insured assailant
Morehead's car, backed by the holdit-t5 ir Stecker and Butns and the
fact that Morehead and his buddies
were charged rvith violatrng several
cnmrnal laws of Montana, refused to
defend or rndemni$ Morehead, its
insured driver, or his passengers.
However, the existence of
criminal charges or guilty pleas may
counsel has plead

his conduct was intentional insisting
his actions were caused by

Malathion poisoning in weed spray
which he later dropped as unsupported by expert testrmony. Júdge
Cebull denied the insurer's request
that it be granted surrnìarJ judgment
that there was no coverage by reason
of the insured's intentional acts. He
noted that the insured's admission of
probable cause in the proceeding for
criminal mischief did not amouflt to
an admission of intentional conduct
that would as z matter of law void
the insurance.

In situations

that do not in-

volve violent felonious conduct, the

court appears to follow the "four
corners" de and, as noted in Lindsay DdIIing & Contracting v. U. S.
FidelÍty & Guar. Co.,to requires
defense if the claim "sets forth facts
which represent a risk covered by
the terms oF the insurance policy."
In Lindsay DrÍIIíng, the plaintiff

U.S.F.&G.

tive, negligent, is a common method

by which plaintiffs counsel

deals

with conduct which Lhe insurer may
wish to deem intentional for purposes of avoiding coverage. Pleading intentional torts allows plaintiffs
counsel to confront the defendant
with the risk of punitive damages
but also creates risk to the plaintiff
that he or she will lose the right to
defense and indemnity thereby defeating the only viable source of
recovery. Pleading negligence in the
alternative makes it fuÃy certain that
the insuter will have to defend a¡rd
creates risk that it will also have to
indemni$r while also creatìng risk
that the plaintiff will not be able to
maintain the specter of punitive
':.

P¿.cB
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In any event, counsel
should be careful in any case iuvolv-

damages.

ing egregious conduct, i.e., inten.
tional corporate pollutron or minister's sexual relation with ¿ parishioner he is counseling, not to plead

nto punitìve damages and out of
insurance.

It

smoke. In fact, the smoke tumed out

intentional and held the policy

to be dangerously toxic, causing
damage. The court, considering

exclusion did not apply.

whether Strainer's act was inten-

from the nature of the act that it
evinces an intent to injure, it will bar

tional so as to bar coverage, cited the
earlier case of lt{otthwestetn \Iational Cas. v. Phalenla
Phalen clearly established that

should be noted here that
insurance of punitive damages is an
issue collateral to that of insurance
of intentional acts. While courts in
some states hold as a matter oF
public policy that insurance cälnot
cover punitive damages,tt itr 1984,
the Montana Supreme Court held in

intentional acts are not excluded

First Bank (1,{.4.)-Billings

The court found that Strainer's
act was volitional but that the results
were not intended. This meant the
act could be intentional for purposes
of avoiding the workers' compensa-

v.

Ttansametica fns, Co.rt' thntptoviding insurance covetage for puniúve damages is not contrarT to public policy and said, "we leave the
decision of whether coverage will be
permitted to the insurance c¿rriers
and their customers." The enactment of MCA 533-15-317 n 1987,
stating that punitive damage coverage only exists insofar as it expressly
appears in the insurance policy language, implicitly confìrmed the
court's declaration of public policy.
This is important because with the
passing of the insurance "crisis" of
the 1980s, punitrve damage coverage
has agaur appeàred in the softer insurarìce market in policies urcluding,
for instance, those auto policies
issued by State Farm.

Where the act is volitional but not

intentional
Some acts are volitional but

not

Millers
Mut, fns, Co, v. Sft^ine4tu zn
ASARCO employee and safety offiintentional. For example, in

cer, Strainer, attempted a pncacal
joke on a fellow employee by removrng a frlter tube on his respirator

with the expectation that the fellow
employee would ilrhale harmless
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under an insurance policy unless the

intentional act results in injuries
which would be expected or
intended. A person may act intentionally without intending or expectiTrg the consequences of that
15

zct.

tion bar for the injured employee,
but not be intentional under the
insurance policy exclusion. On the
other hand, courts frequently
refuse insurance coverage for what
I(eeton16 calls "incredibly foolish
conduct." This doctrine, called the
"Damfl Fool" doctrine, refers to that
body of cases where courts have
refused insurance coverage for acts
"too ill conceived to warcanl

allowing the actor to transfer the
risk of such conduct to an insuret."
Judge Molloy relied on Phalen
znd Millers Mutual in deciding
Safeco fns. Co. of Ametica v.
Tunkle.t' Larson was entering Tunkle's house when Tunkle shot him
several times. A criminal jury acquitted Tunkle by reason ofselfdefense.
Safeco, Tunkle's homeowner's insurer, refused to defend on the
ground that the shooting was not arl
"accident" so as to be a covered
"occurrence" ãrd thus, it was excluded as an intentional act. However, Judge Molloy found self
defense to be volitional and not

However,

if

the court can

see

coverage under the intentional acts

exclusion as it did in Ameican
States fns. Co. v. l%ÍIloughby.rs
There, Neilsen's conduct included
hitting, biting and kicking two security guards who were attemptrng to
restrain him. The guards later sued
Neilsen fot their iniuries. The court
found no separation between the
volitional act and the intent to cause
the resulting damage.

Vhere the act is intentional, but
the damage was not expected or
intended
Because the policy language
generally excludes "damage expected or intended by the insured,"
the logical method of securing coverage of an act thzt mzy be deemed
intentional is to prove that the defendant didn't expect or intend the
damage. Success in gaining the coverage probably depends on the nature of the act itself. Mutual Setuice Cas. Ins. Co. v. McGehee,'o
stands for the broad proposition
that there is no coverage under standard policy language for acts intended even if there is no subiective
intent to cause specifìc iniuries.
However, the court in that case also
noted that the insured assailant
"aggressively and intentionally"
struck another in the face. In such
circumstances, the court held that it
was irrelevant that the insured
caused an iniury different in chancter or magnitude from the harm he
subf ectrvely intended.

Where the type or nature of the
act itself is less egregious, the court
will be more liberal in finding that
the damage was unexpected or unin-
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tì-

tended. For example,in

Gdndheim

v. Safeco fns. Co. of Ameicalo
plaintiffs alleged that the Deerfield
Hutterite Colony in Fergus County,
Montana, had for years disposed of
humarr and alimal sewage in a
coulee upstream from plaintiffs
property so that their properly was
damaged by sewage pollution. The
Colony's insurer denied coverage
for defense or indemnity on the
ground that the event u/as not â

from the standpourt of the insured."
The irrþtron district said that the
emotiorul and menul infury claimed
by plaintiff was not tlre intended or
expected consequence of the discharç. However, the court held that
"'the alleçd intentional conduct of
Daly could be expected to cause the
injury claimed by the employee." The
court further stated that "[t]here is no
injury alleçd which could not be expected to flow from the termination."

insuted and, absent a policy provision denying coverage to the innocent insured, may recover. For exam-

ple, in the Washingtofl case of Unigard Mutual Ins. Co. v. Argonaut
fns. Co.rzo the court allowed defense
and indemnity to the parents whose

11-year-old son had damaged

separate policy

covered
"occuffence "
defined under

with the insurer. In
Montana, how-

a'

as
"property dam-

cluded

age which

disagreed
on that point findmg that the policy
"was intended by the parties to that
conffact to insute both intentional
and unintentional acts or omissions
of the Deerfield Colony, excluding
from coverage only bodily injury or
property damage that was expected
or rntended by the Deerfield
Colony."'1 Quoting frcm Pottal
Pìpe Line Co. v. Stonewail fns.
Co.,tt the court stated "the intent of
the policy is to insure the acts or
omissions of the insured, including
[its] intentionâl acts, excludmg only
those in which the resulting injury is
either expected or intended from the
insured's standpoint."
However, in DaIy Ditches b
rigation Dist. v. National Sutety
Corp.,'o the insuret refused coverage under a CGL policy when an
employee sued the irrigatron disttict
for wrongful discharge and breach
of the covenaflt of good faith and
fafu dealíng. The policy defined
"occurrence" as "aîr acci'
dent...neither expected nor intended

PncB 18
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fused

Pztùcia

woodhouse cov-

::iT " iJ:::;
where the home-

owner's

is expected or intended

by the insured." The court

il

ever, the coutt fe-

..."for purposes of uM coverage' an insured's iniuries 'arise out
of the use' of an uninsured vehicle if the iniuries originate from,
i*Jid,"n'r,,
^nlra or grow out of, or flow from the use of the uninsured vehicle."
thar it was ex_
the policy as

a

school with fire, but refused coverage for the son. The court held that
each insured is ffeated as having a

contained

policy

z

clear exclusion barnng
coverage where any insured committed an intentional actthat resulted in

requirement
In TunHe, Judge Molloy the damage. In lVoodhouse v.
found the word "accident" to be
-Fatmerc Uníon Mut. fns. Co.,zs
ambþous. He noted that arrrong \)Toodhouse's coinsured ex-husband
the definitions in Webster's Third
committed suicide by burning himNew Intemational Dictionary were
self to death in the couple's mobile
"lack of intention or necessity, often
home which he had been awarded in
opposed to design" antd"^n unforetheir divorce. She sued the insurer

Avoiding the "accident"

seenunplannedevent."Suchdictio- forcoverageofherpersonalbelongnary de[rnitions leave room for inings which were still in the home.
tended acts with uninter-rded

results,

so that, as in Tunkle, the court
might find them to be a covered

situations in which the insured's voli"occurrence." There are many

tional act may súll be "an unforeseen unplanned event," i.e., engaging in a fight or committing violence
in self defense.

The court found the exclusion to be
clear in barring coverage for the

of "an insured" even
that meant the innocent insured
could not recover.
intentiona.l acts

if

Where the intentional act is an

"accident'' from the

vantage

point of the insured
Returning to the Wendell case
with which this artrcle started, State

Where one insured is innocent
If a policy covefs co-insureds, Farm insured the vehicle driven by
and one of them commits the intenassailant Morehead and his buddies
tional act which excludes coverage and also insured the vehicle driven

that would normally provide benefìts to the other, then the other
insured is deemed an j'innocent"

by the injured Wendell.

Wendell

claimed against assailant Morehead,
and State Farm refused coverage on

Tnrnr Tnnrvos - Wrrurnn 2000

it

I

of their insured,

Morehead,
were intentional. Wendell then made a claim under his
Uninsured Mototist (JNf) coverage, arrd Stâte Farm

the ground that the acts

refused that claim on the ground that the policy did

not provide coverage for injuries which were not
caused by an accident arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.
Hence, the Mo;rtana Supreme Court ultimately considered two issues: (1) !7as the iniury caused by "accident"? and (2) did it arise out of the use of an

Greg Skakles secured compensation for his client

and a good piece of law for plaintiffs' lawyers.
lYendell is important to plaintiffs' lawyers who will
face the frustration of attempting to frnd a source of
compensation for victims of intentional conduct involving automobiles. Consider, for example, the implications of this case for insurability of injuries arising
from sexual assaults in vehicles, road tage, and tobberies involving motor vehicles.

uninsured motor vehicle?

Conclusion

The court found "accident" to be ambþous,
because it was unclear from whose vãttage point it
was defined. The court held that, for purposes of UM

Securing adequate compensation for victims of
intentìonal torts is often hopeless. Commonly, the only
asset available to the plaintiff itr settlement or satisfaction of a verdict is an assþment of whatever rights
the tortfeasor has for defense and indemnity under a
casualry insurance policy. In a case whete the tortfeasor's conduct may be deemed by the insurer to be
intentional, it is important to know how to plead and
develop the facts so that the claim comes within the
coverage fot an "occurrence" which is defined as "at1
accident" and to avoid the intentional acts exclusion of

coverage, whether an "accídent" has occurred must be
viewed from the standpoint of the insured, so that the

intentjonal act of anothet rnay be an "accident" for the
insured. The coutt further held that, "for purposes of
UM coverage, an insured's ir-riuries 'arise out of the
use' of an uninsured vehicle if the iniuries originate

from, or grow out of, or flow from the use of the
uninsured vehicle." Consequently, Wendell had been
rnfured ln an "zccident" arisitrg out of the use of a¡r
uninsured motor vehicle.
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